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SALT (I)

THE STRATEGIC BALANCE BETWEEN HOPE AND SKEPTICISM

by Paul H. Nitze

There are two vital policy issues related to strategic arms. The first concerns the best way to negotiate—and the prospects for accord on—meaningful strategic arms limitation agreements. The second concerns what to do about the U.S. strategic defense posture in view of the imminent deployment of the new family of Soviet offensive systems. Inasmuch as these two issues are themselves interrelated, there is only one overriding question of operational significance: What should the United States now do about strategic arms?

This question cannot be viewed in a vacuum. Arms development, deployment, and control policy derive from our foreign and national security policy and that, in turn, is intimately related to the state of our domestic affairs and to domestic policy. The scope of considerations bearing on the problem is almost limitless. It is therefore necessary to find some way to simplify our approach.

Someone else would undoubtedly summarize the Washington strategic arms debate differently, but my version can at least serve as a starting point.

One point of view runs as follows:

> Détente is a good thing. Further arms control agreements can help to make détente irreversible.

> Superiority is meaningless. It is asked, in Secretary Kissinger's words, "What in the name of God is strategic superiority? What is the significance of it politically, militarily, operationally at these levels of numbers? What do you do with it?"

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> Not stated, but implicit, is the judgment that there is little prospect at present that the Soviet side can be persuaded to significantly curtail their planned programs. To try to match the new Soviet deployments in an effort to maintain equality would be meaningless (we already have overkill capabilities), costly, and endanger détente. The public, the military, and the Congress must, therefore, be convinced that it is wise to accept Soviet nuclear superiority.

In sum, the essence of this point of view is that in order to make détente irreversible, the United States should both accept Soviet nuclear superiority and codify it in arms control agreements which provide for unequal limitations on the two sides.

Those who are skeptical about this policy argue as follows:

> Those responsibly concerned for continuing U.S. national security, in particular those in the Department of Defense, have not been and are not against arms control. They would like to see effective limitations which would provide equality, or essential equivalence, in the strategic nuclear capabilities of the United States and the Soviet Union, which would contribute to crisis stability, and which would provide a basis for reducing the arms competition.

> It is not impossible to reach an agreement on such arms control measures. However, there is a question as to whether, under former President Nixon, the decision-making and negotiating processes were so designed and used as to optimize the prospect of achieving such agreement.

> Why shouldn't the United States be entitled to equality? Is not inferiority the opposite of superiority? What degree of inferiority is it proposed that the United States accept? Is a deterrent posture such as that of the French adequate? What is the probable political effect of various degrees of recognized inferiority? What would be the effect of such inferiority upon the quality of deterrence and thus the prospect of war? What could the effect be should deterrence fail? Is

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inferiority more tolerable in the absence of agreement than if ratified by agreement?

> The overkill argument misses the following points. It deals with weapons in inventory, not with alert, reliable, survivable, penetrating weapons subject to proper command and control. It deals with today's situation rather than that of the critical period five, ten, or fifteen years from now.

> The Soviet side does not view détente in the same broad sense in which some Americans do. There is little confidence that even the current limited benefits of détente would continue indefinitely if the Soviet side were to achieve clear strategic superiority.

> A positive program for long-term better relations with the Soviet Union should include not only SALT agreements but also economic agreements which contribute equally to U.S. and Soviet interests and a certain degree of progress toward respect for human freedom.

Implicit in the skeptics' argument is that to the extent it is not possible to have confidence in achieving essential equivalence, crisis stability, and strategic arms reductions through agreement, the United States should respond to the imminent deployment of the new family of Soviet strategic systems through appropriate increases in U.S. strategic programs.

U.S. Objectives in SALT

As the U.S. delegation saw it, U.S. objectives in the SALT negotiations were threefold. First, to seek both the reality and appearance of equality, or essential equivalence, of the permitted levels of strategic arms capabilities of both sides. Second, to seek limitations which would help maintain crisis stability and thus reduce the risk of nuclear war. Third, to provide a basis for reducing the arms competition. Certain constraints had to be kept in mind: the agreements must be adequately verifiable by national technical means; they must take our allies' interests into account and be generally acceptable to them; and they must be mutual-

ly acceptable to both sides—and thus meet the test of negotiability.

There is a certain internal conflict between these various objectives and constraints. It is important, therefore, to consider the priorities which we should attach to each. I once discussed this at length with Elliot Richardson when he was Secretary of Defense. I advanced the view that the second objective was the most important and the third the least important. Richardson agreed the third was the least important, but disagreed with my argument that the maintenance of crisis stability, which bore most directly on the quality of deterrence, was more important than maintaining essential equivalence. He had been impressed by the point lucidly advanced by Professor Samuel Huntington that the American people would not long tolerate a position of strategic inferiority and that the greatest risk of war would arise if the Soviets achieved clear superiority and the United States then began to initiate a program to regain equality or essential equivalence. In any case, maintaining crisis stability, if not the most important objective, is an important one.

I think the clearest case of crisis instability was that existing in Europe in 1914, when the ability to mobilize rapidly was considered essential to assure an advantage. Thus, when Austria mobilized against Serbia, Russia believed it had to respond. This forced Germany to respond. The forces leading to war thus became uncontrollable. Similarly, in the late 1950's, when most of the strategic power of the two sides was concentrated on a small number of highly vulnerable airfields and early warning systems were ineffective, a potentially overwhelming advantage could have been obtained by the side striking first. Those who argue that new technology and further strategic weapons deployments do not add to the security of either side, ignore the great increase in crisis stability that has taken place since the late 1950's. The process can go either way. The task today is to make sure that the progress we have

made is maintained and not reversed.

As one looks toward the future, all identifiable fixed positions, including silos, airfields, large and thus fixed radars, submarine pens, etc., are potentially vulnerable. So are moving systems that can be localized and barraged or tracked. Even fast-moving satellites can be shot out of the sky. Each year ABM technology improves; the new site defense radar now under development should be a twenty-fifth of the volume, correspondingly decreased in cost, and more capable than the smaller of the two radars now being readied at our ABM site at Grand Forks, North Dakota. Submarines are difficult to localize or to track, but in time this system, like any other, will be vulnerable to countermeasures unless equally effective counter-countermeasures are developed.

Under such circumstances, how does one maintain crisis stability? The best approach would be through agreed arms control measures. It is not difficult to conceive of limitations which would go far toward solving the problem. Let us say that both sides agree to scrap all their present ICBM's and substitute thousands of new ICBM's, each with a throw-weight (a measure of the potential power of a missile to propel a useful payload to intercontinental distances) of no more than 200 pounds. Within such a throw-weight limitation an effective combination of yield and accuracy for a single missile to destroy more than one silo becomes inherently infeasible. Therefore, since reliability will always be less than perfect, a stable relationship should result. But such hypothetical solutions have two constraints—verifiability and negotiability. Certain of the most important qualitative characteristics of strategic weapons, such as accuracy, are inherently unverifiable. Furthermore, the Soviets are not, under present circumstances, prepared to scrap the systems they now have deployed or to forgo the new systems they are now testing and are about to deploy. Therefore, realistic solutions to the problem of maintaining crisis stability through arms

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control agreements must be weighed against the test of their negotiability.

How to Negotiate Strategic Arms Agreements

The original U.S. and Soviet delegations to the Strategic Arms Talks were selected and appointed almost exactly five years ago. We first convened at Helsinki in the fall of 1969. From the very beginning there was a question as to how the Soviet side would approach the talks. Our overwhelming opinion was that the Soviets shared our view that in such bilateral negotiations between the two major nuclear powers, neither side could expect the other to settle for less than parity, that the imperfect information as to each other's deployment plans and strategic concepts was unsatisfactory and potentially dangerous, and that it was in everyone's interest to arrive at agreements which would reduce the instabilities of the past and thus enhance security on both sides.

A minority on the U.S. side, particularly those who had, over the years, studied Soviet theory and practice, had a different view. They believed that the Soviet side would look at the talks primarily from their own political viewpoint, would seek to optimize Soviet gains through the talks, and would use tactics similar to those they had used on important issues in the past. I shared the hopes of the majority but also the skepticism of the minority.

Soviet Organization and Tactics in the Negotiations

At the very first session at Helsinki, it became clear that the skeptics had a strong case. It soon became evident that the Soviet side had worked out a highly one-sided theory and were prepared to use a wide range of tactics to achieve its goal.

Let me first describe the composition of their delegation, including advisers and staff. Vladimir S. Semenov, the head of the delegation, is a Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, and thus outranks the chief of the U.S.

delegation. His original number two was General Nikolay V. Ogarkov, Deputy Chief of Staff, who outranked the senior U.S. military member of the delegation. The Executive Secretary of their delegation, Nikolay S. Kishilov, was a senior KGB officer who had some years earlier been thrown out of Finland when it was revealed that he and a woman who had purported to be his wife were running two separate spy rings in Finland. Petr S. Pleshakov is Minister of the Radio Industry which builds all the radars and electronic gear for the Soviet military. Academician Alexandr N. Shchukin is one of their senior and most distinguished scientists who has played a leading role in the research and development leading to their major weapons systems. At least a third of their staff had had KGB experience. Many of their military advisers had affiliation with military intelligence. Yereskovsky, who is now part of their staff, was well known when he served in the Soviet Embassy in Washington as a Soviet expert on U.S. congressional relations.

Their tactics covered a wide range. When we moved into our offices in Helsinki, it was found that a Tass correspondent had rented a room overlooking them. It was equipped with telescopes, antennas, and various other gadgets. It soon became apparent that all but the most secure telephone communications were being monitored. To protect their own intelligence security the Soviets had gone to the most extreme measures. All their chauffeurs were officers in military intelligence. The "need to know" principle was fully enforced. Foreign Office people, and even their scientists and military production people, were not permitted to know anything not appearing in the U.S. press about Soviet military deployments.

They made an attempt to break down individual members of the U.S. team. Initially they tried to get people to drink too much. When it didn't work, they abandoned it. They invited us to Leningrad and inundated us with stories about the siege of

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Leningrad. They tried to flatter individual members of the team, hoping to play on possible disagreements within it.

In the actual substantive negotiations they employed an amazing tactical versatility. They used words in other than their normally accepted sense, or quotations out of context or subtly modified, and exploited the differences in nuance between Russian words and their English equivalents.

Another technique was to attempt to get an agreement in principle, without exposing how it would be implemented. Still another, to package elements of the problem together in a manner advantageous to their side. Another was to create expectations that if we conceded a given point, then other important points would become easy to resolve.

They would use imprecise language in presenting provisions which would limit their side and precise language where the object was to limit U.S. actions.

They liked the tactic of presenting a full draft of an agreement at the earliest opportunity so that subsequent negotiations would be on the basis of their text, not a U.S. text.

They thoroughly understand the value of endless repetition, of taking the high ground to gain trading room, of making concessions grudgingly and only for equal or greater concessions, of moving to stronger positions rather than compromising, of unexpectedly shifting the subject of negotiations from one field to another.

They understand the importance of deadlines and uses of delay, the ways in which multiple levels of negotiations can be exploited, and the importance of negotiating on one's home territory.

They always negotiate ad referendum to higher authority. Even Chairman Brezhnev has withdrawn positions he had previously agreed to, on grounds that the Politburo had not concurred.

All of these techniques can be countered by an experienced and cohesive team of negotiators on the other side. But when one

is negotiating in this kind of ambiance, the most extreme care and almost perfect coordination are required to avoid errors. In my judgment this has not always been achieved, even to the somewhat limited extent possible in a democratic society.

*U.S. Organization and Tactics
in the Negotiations*

The U.S. delegation, both at SALT I and SALT II, was, in my opinion, highly competent, cohesive, and well led. Ambassador Gerard Smith was the original head of the SALT delegation; subsequently Ambassador Alexis Johnson was appointed as his replacement. The other members of the delegation were drawn from the State Department, the Defense Department, the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The delegation was ably supported from the intelligence standpoint by the CIA. There were differences of approach between the members of the delegation, but the often intense arguing out of those differences generally resulted in a consensus within the delegation, or a decision by the head of the delegation, wiser than the initial positions of any of the participants.

Our most difficult problems sprang from the necessity of reconciling what appeared to be the optimum approach in dealing with the tactics of the Soviet side and instructions from higher authority in Washington, or in obtaining clarifications of or amendments to those instructions. There was a constant flow of detailed reporting to Washington through State Department channels. In addition, there were direct channels of reporting from the various members of the delegation to the departments and agencies which had nominated them. The sound practice arose of making copies of all such "back-channel" communications available to the head of the delegation.

The main reasons why the results of the delegation's efforts were less than optimum were errors in judgment by higher author-

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ities in Washington, both on strategy and tactics and on the development of two levels of negotiation—the first between the two delegations, and the second, higher level of negotiation between Kissinger, Nixon, and Ambassador Dobrynin, and, on occasion, with Brezhnev and his associates.

"... there is no precise U.S. record of what was said."

These two levels were inadequately coordinated on the U.S. side while they were much better coordinated on the Soviet side.

Nixon had such a passion for secrecy and such a lack of confidence in the reliability and judgment of what he considered to be the bureaucracy, that not even the head of the U.S. delegation was kept precisely informed of what was happening at the higher level. This went to such lengths that at discussions at the highest level, Nixon would rely on the Soviet interpreters rather than the more competent American interpreters whose notes might be made available to others on the U.S. side. As a result, there is no precise U.S. record of what was said. Even the less precise memoranda of discussion, subsequently dictated by a member of Kissinger's staff, were not made available outside of the White House. It was not even the practice to give a full oral debriefing to those who had a need to know. I believe this situation still exists even after Nixon's resignation—and that it is a serious mistake.

A further consequence of this two-level negotiation was that it deprived the President and his immediate advisers of available expertise and of the ability to fine comb the relevant detail. This resulted in wholly unnecessary difficulties, some of significant consequence, in parrying Soviet strategy and tactics.

The Correlation of Forces

The way in which world events are perceived by the two sides during the negotia-

tions is an even more fundamental factor than their organizational arrangements and negotiating tactics.

At the initial sessions of SALT I at Helsinki, the U.S. delegation dwelt at length on the distinction between a zero-sum game, in which one side's gains are equal to the other side's losses, and a non-zero-sum game, in which both sides can either win or lose. It was our contention that the nuclear relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union is analogous to a non-zero-sum game, not to a zero-sum game. We argued that an agreement which provided essential equivalence, and which maintained or enhanced crisis stability, would add to the security of both sides, reduce the risk of nuclear war, do so at a reduced cost in resources, and thus be of mutual benefit. We further contended that only if both sides approached the negotiations with the objective of optimizing mutual gains could the conflicting views be resolved on whether one side's gains would be, or appear to be, the other side's losses. I still believe that this approach is essential to negotiating sound agreements.

The Soviet side did not accept this viewpoint. Soviet doctrine has always placed heavy emphasis upon what they call the "correlation of forces." In this term, they include the aggregate of all the forces bearing upon the situation—including psychological, political, and economic factors. Soviet officials took the view that the correlation of forces had been and would continue to move in their favor. They deduced from this the proposition that even though we might, at a given time, believe their proposals to be one-sided and inequitable, realism would eventually bring us to accept at least the substance of them.

Among the factors which affected the Soviet view of the trend in the correlation of forces was their estimate of the political unity, strength, and will of the United States. This estimate was undoubtedly affected by the U.S. impeachment process. Another fac-

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tor was, and continues to be, their view of the economic upheaval caused by inflation and the increase in oil, food, and other basic raw materials prices. Still another factor is their evaluation of political, psychological, and social conditions in Europe, Japan, and the developing world. And finally, their evaluation of the future build-up of relative military capabilities, including strategic nuclear capabilities. Undoubtedly, there are other and possibly offsetting considerations, including Soviet relations with China and the always present internal strains in a centrally controlled society. On balance, however, they have reason for their stated belief that the net correlation of forces has been, and is, changing in their favor. Until this trend changes, the prospects for obtaining arms control agreements which would significantly relieve the strain upon the U.S. defense posture are less than good. For the Soviet side to become persuaded to approach the negotiations from a non-zero-sum approach rather than from a zero-sum approach requires that there be an evident change in their view as to the probable evolution of the correlation of forces in the future.

The U.S. Strategic Defense Posture

I will now discuss the second vital strategic arms issue—what to do about the U.S. strategic defense posture in view of the imminent deployment of the new family of Soviet offensive systems. This new family includes a broad range of improved capabilities. At least three of the systems tested include modern MIRV technology. There are substantial increases in throw-weight (the SS-19 may have up to three times the throw-weight of the SS-11, which it would replace). Some use a cold launch technique which could make fairly rapid reloading possible. The new silos are substantially harder and thus less vulnerable than those they would replace. All include improved guidance techniques through the availability of sophisticated on-board computers. The re-entry vehicles being tested are of a form ap-

appropriate for higher accuracy. The warheads probably have improved weight-to-yield ratios. One of the systems is appropriate for deployment in mobile launchers. The command and control elements of the various systems have been improved. And there are indications that additional systems beyond those now being tested are in the process of being developed.

In the SLBM (sea-launched ballistic missile) field, other new offensive systems are in the process of development or deployment, including the 4,200-mile SSN-8 being deployed on the Delta class submarines.

Coupled with these developments are improved satellite surveillance techniques (both photographic and electronic), powerful over-the-horizon radars, and satellite interceptors.

The aggregate throw-weight of deployed Soviet offensive missile systems promises to exceed 10 million pounds and could go to 15 million pounds or higher.

What then is the nature of our problem in maintaining the quality of deterrence? Let us assume that 2,000 pounds of throw-weight are needed to give high confidence of achieving a 95 per cent probability of destroying a hardened fixed point, that 3,500 pounds of throw-weight are required to blanket an area of 400 square miles with blast and radiation effects sufficient to destroy an aircraft in flight, that 15,000 pounds of throw-weight are necessary to disable a submarine, localized to a 300 square mile area of the sea, by a barrage attack. Let us further assume the Soviets wish to destroy 1,200 fixed points, blanket 400,000 square miles of aircraft escape area, and barrage 100 aim points at sea. How much throw-weight would be required? The first task would require 2.4 million pounds, the second task 3 million pounds, the third task 1.5 million pounds—approximately half the Soviet throw-weight could be kept in reserve. This being an unclassified paper, none of the above assumptions are necessarily close to the mark. They are offered only to

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illustrate the type of problem we face in trying to make sure that we have the forces to provide high quality deterrence into the 1980's.

One approach, strongly advocated by some ABM opponents in the 1969 debate, is to adopt a policy of launch on assured warning of a massive attack. The problem with such an approach is that the cutoff line between what constitutes a massive attack and what constitutes less than a massive attack could be ambiguous, that the time for decision would be extremely short, and that, with an unprotected capital, the President might not be in a position to make the decision; it might have to be delegated, and to whom? It may nevertheless be wise to develop the capability for the launching of ICBM's on assured warning with an open circuit, requiring an inflight command for activation, with appropriate preplanning for its possible use, as proposed by Simon Ramo. Related to this option is the question of further hardening of our missiles during boost phase to further assure against a pin-down strategy by the other side.

Another approach is to make a portion of our ICBM force mobile, either land mobile or air mobile. The usual objection to land mobile systems—that the number of such systems deployed can only be verified within fairly wide margins—seems to me incommensurate with the strategic problem involved. Considering the levels of missile throw-weight, the numbers of re-entry vehicles, and the weight of the individual warheads the Soviets are expected to deploy, further clandestine increments would have no appreciable effect on U.S. fixed silo vulnerability. The question of strategic significance is that of assuring, through mobility, the prelaunch survivability of a U.S. land-based ICBM component in the face of expected and possible Soviet deployments.

Another possible approach is to increase the proportion of our retaliatory force capability at sea. In the short term, the best course would be to accelerate the deploy-

ment of Trident I missiles in Poseidon submarines. The most cost-effective way to increase survivable throw-weight beyond that which existing Poseidon boats can provide is to proceed with the existing Trident submarine program or even to expand it from two submarines a year to three and eventually equip them with Trident II missiles. In the long run, substantially more effective systems are conceivable but much study and development work will be required before we can proceed to deploy such a new system. Among the SLBM problems to be coped with are reliable and timely command and control.

With respect to the bomber and bomber defense components of the deterrent, there are important problems to be met in the context of maintaining an offsetting contribution to parity. This requires assuring the prelaunch survivability and escape survivability of the bombers and the penetration to target capability of bomber armaments, and denying the Soviets a substantially free ride for their future bomber force.

The cheapest and fastest way of maintaining the reality and appearance of parity—but not necessarily of crisis stability—is to develop and deploy a new missile launched from existing Minuteman silos. Such a missile could have, say, four times the throw-weight of Minuteman III, be extremely cheap per pound of throw-weight, and could be ready for testing in about a year. The most difficult general problem is that of assuring reliable and survivable command and control systems as a whole.

The above is intended merely to suggest the range of approaches which must be explored and on which decisions must be made if (a) the judgment is correct that we cannot have high confidence in achieving SALT agreements, beyond the ABM treaty, which will significantly reduce the stress on our strategic defense problem, and (b) we propose to maintain rough parity, high confidence deterrence, and thus crisis stability.

The question of cost is, of course, vital.

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In the last few years the direct annual cost of our strategic programs has been running at about \$8 billion. The allocable indirect costs are probably of a lesser but roughly comparable magnitude, but would not necessarily vary in any direct relationship to additional direct costs. It is impossible to estimate with any precision the costs of a program of the nature suggested above. To make a rough guess as to the general range of the magnitudes involved, the increment to current strategic expenditures in constant 1974 dollars might be as low as \$2 billion a year or as high as \$10 billion. The economic significance of such an increase can be assessed against many criteria: percentage of GNP (far less than 1 per cent); percentage of the current total defense budget (3 to 15 per cent); by the degree it complicates the problem of achieving a balanced budget in the interest of halting inflation; the continuing balance-of-payments problems of the United States; and its potential impact on other desirable programs, such as energy, environment, and the elimination of poverty.

Why Make the Effort?

I turn now to what may be the most important set of subissues: the desirability of maintaining parity, high quality deterrence, and crisis stability, and the probable consequences of not doing so. Each of these issues is undoubtedly controversial.

I would advance the thesis that détente, in the sense of warm formal relations with the Soviet Union, should continue, and that continuing negotiations with the Soviet Union is desirable. But détente does not imply any change in long-term Soviet aims or expectations, or any reliable continuing restraint on Soviet actions. Their interest in maintaining the atmosphere of détente can exercise a certain tactical restraint upon what they say and do from time to time. I see little in the arguments that we must make sacrifices to the Soviet Union to help maintain Brezhnev in office. The Soviet system doesn't work that way. Nor do I believe that

Nixon's so-called personal relationship with Brezhnev was as significant as he would have had us believe.

What evidence is there on which to base a judgment on the future evolution of Soviet intentions regarding the strategic situation and the political arena? We have some decades of experience both with Soviet actions and words; we have their more current statements, some directed to us and others directed to Soviet audiences; we have evidence from the development of capabilities and programs for future capabilities.

I believe that the historical evidence, the evidence of what members of the Soviet hierarchy say to themselves, and the evidence from the capabilities the Soviets are developing tend to support the following propositions: The Soviet leadership places emphasis on ambitious goals, including general hegemony, is cautious in protecting itself and what it already controls, and continues to emphasize its estimate of the correlation of forces in making its decisions. It is unlikely, were the correlation of forces to move further in a direction which they judge to be favorable, that the Soviets would not exploit that change. Certainly we cannot have high confidence that they would not.

One might ask whether the U.S.-Soviet nuclear relationship is an important element in the Soviet view of the evolution of the correlation of forces. It would seem that the enormous effort and the concomitant sacrifices of other Soviet interests that their strategic program did and continues to represent, is adequate evidence that it is an important element.

Could a significant shift in the U.S.-Soviet strategic relationship lead to an increased danger of war? It was Clausewitz's view that war exists for the benefit of the defender; the aggressor would always prefer to achieve his aims without war. I believe that the Soviet Union does not want nuclear war and would not want it even if it had overwhelming nuclear superiority. The evidence, however, supports the proposition.

that they consider a nuclear war-winning capability to be the best deterrent, that they would make a pre-emptive strike if they saw a danger of otherwise sustaining the first blow, and that they would have serious difficulty in exercising political restraint if local conditions permitted actualizing gains toward their long-term goals. They understand the importance of not changing the situation so radically at any one time that it might provoke unmanageable counterreactions.

What would be the effect on third countries of a significant change in the U.S.-Soviet nuclear relationship? It would seem probable that such a change would tend to increase accommodation to Soviet views. In the case of certain countries, I should think it would increase the incentives to have nuclear capabilities of their own and thus increase proliferation.

In short, if one does not want to see either an increase in the prospects for general Soviet hegemony or an increase in the risk of nuclear war, it is necessary to maintain the quality of deterrence, crisis stability, and rough strategic parity. There may be general agreement with that proposition, but there is disagreement as to what is necessary to satisfy the criteria, particularly that of rough parity.

I don't think that anyone quarrels with the proposition that there was rough parity in 1969 or in 1972, or that there is in 1974. There have been changes in the strategic force deployments of both sides, but any net shift in the quality of deterrence, crisis stability, or parity can be judged to have been marginal. On the other hand, it seems clear that during the period from 1961 to 1968, the United States enjoyed a clear margin of superiority. My point is that despite the complexity of the inputs, it is not that difficult to distinguish between rough parity, meaningful superiority, and unsatisfactory inferiority, and that any attempt to deceive the public or allies on this score would be counterproductive.

Conclusions

We should continue to seek an effective and balanced agreement with the Soviet Union on the limitation of strategic offensive arms. To simplify the negotiation of such an agreement, I believe we should concentrate on four concurrent approaches to the problem. The first, and perhaps the least likely of success, is to continue the effort to negotiate roughly equal ceilings on the throw-weight of MIRVed missiles at a low enough level to be meaningful; i.e., low enough to postpone significantly the day when a high percentage of the hardened silos of the other side would become vulnerable to a counterforce attack. The second is to negotiate roughly equal ceilings on the overall missile throw-weight, MIRVed and unMIRVed, of both sides, with realistic allowance for the bomber equivalent of missile throw-weight. The third is to negotiate a schedule of phased reductions in these ceilings to lower levels, even lower, if possible, than planned U.S. deployment levels. The fourth is to encourage, rather than avoid, an objective exchange of views on the relative strategic capability of those U.S. and Soviet nuclear-capable forces whose role is not primarily an intercontinental strategic one, both in a theater and an intercontinental context. I believe such a joint objective analysis is a prerequisite to Soviet acceptance of rough parity in the ceilings on those weapons systems which have primarily a strategic role. Even if the first approach were impossible to attain, success in achieving the last three would still constitute a significant and useful accomplishment.

In my view, we should return to the objective of negotiating an agreement of indefinite duration. I see little prospect that an agreement limited in duration to 10 years could effectively mitigate the long-term defense problem facing the United States.

My second conclusion is that it is uncertain, and in fact doubtful, that we can, under present circumstances, negotiate an ef-

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fective and balanced strategic offensive arms limitation agreement which would reduce the long-term stress on our defense posture. For this to be possible a change in the Soviet perception of the prospective correlation of forces would be necessary. This would require greater internal cohesion within the United States and within the alliance structure, an improvement in the economic and monetary prospects of the non-Communist world, and an indication that the United States is determined under all circumstances to maintain high quality strategic deterrence.

My third conclusion is that, both in order to optimize the prospects of eventual success in attaining a balanced and effective offensive strategic arms agreement and to meet the situation should that not be possible, the United States must make the difficult analyses and take the difficult decisions as how best to meet, through our own timely strategic deployments, the increased threat inherent in the anticipated deployment of the new family of Soviet strategic systems. It is by no means clear that the programs which have been authorized and which have received appropriations in the latest action by Congress—including the Trident and B-1 programs—will, in themselves, be adequate for the purpose.

It is in the Soviet interest as well as that of the United States to minimize the risk that conflicts in local areas will result in direct military confrontation between the two superpowers, and to limit the proliferation of nuclear weapons to additional states. Within détente, a special relationship has therefore evolved between the two superpowers, characterized by the Hot Line and a continuing process of high-level bilateral discussion. Recent Soviet experience in foreign policy allows the Russians to present their understanding of this special relationship in terms which Malcolm Mackintosh puts as follows:

We welcome détente and a special relationship with you, and we want them to

cover a wide variety of international activities, and to become institutionalized and irreversible. We also want you to accept our definitions of parity in military strength. But you must recognize that we believe that our policies and outlook are scientifically based and historically correct; that if we seek a change in the balance of power in our favor and a move in individual countries toward regimes favorable to us, we are justified in doing so before history and our political beliefs; and you, whose policies fly in the face of history, cannot match the soundness of our views or the forward march of our influence. If you want to play the power game within this special relationship, and we believe you do, we will play it too; and you may win temporary successes. But our successes will turn out to be the irreversible ones; we shall never give up our attempts to change the political alignments of countries we regard as important. If you think that détente or our new relationship will lessen the intensity of the ideological (i.e., political) struggle between us, you are making a great mistake.

The question for the United States is that of how best to react to such a position. It is my impression, after many years of negotiating with the Soviets, that they respect competence in their opponents; that they see no reason not to exploit weakness or incompetence. I see it as extremely important to preserve the special relationship that has evolved with the Soviets, particularly insofar as it assists in minimizing the prospects of direct military confrontation. I do not, however, believe that the effectiveness of this special relationship would be enhanced by our agreeing to unequal SALT agreements favoring the Soviet side or by a deterioration in the present high quality of the U.S. deterrent posture in the strategic arms field.